

BROADCOM INC.

Equity Research • Independent Investment Analysis | Semiconductors & Infrastructure Software | NASDAQ: AVGO

RECOMMENDATION	12-MONTH TARGET RANGE	INVESTMENT SCORE
BUY	\$500 – \$560	74.5 / 100
Reaffirmed — unchanged from the August edition	Probability-weighted fair value \$456	Down from 75; valuation +1, risk & technicals –1 each

Price (Aug 17, 2026)	\$392.43	Market Cap	\$1.87 T	52-Week Range	\$281.87–\$495.00
Change since Aug 5	–6.2%	Enterprise Value	\$1.91 T	Beta (5Y)	1.47
Trailing P/E (GAAP)	65.3x	FY26E P/E (adj.)	33.7x	FY27E P/E (adj.)	20.1x
Revenue (TTM)	\$75.5 B (+32%)	Free Cash Flow (TTM)	\$32.8 B	Net Debt	\$45.3 B
Dividend / Yield	\$2.60 / 0.66%	Shares Out.	4.76 B	Short Interest	1.29% of shares
Next Earnings	Sep 2, 2026 (AMC)	Consensus Target	\$527.88	Analyst Rating	Strong Buy (48)

Investment Thesis

The pullback the previous report asked for has arrived, and it arrived without the numbers behind it changing. Broadcom closed at \$392.43 on 17 August, 6.2% below the \$418.28 used a fortnight ago and 20.7% below the June high of \$495. Over the same period consensus fiscal 2027 revenue held at \$173.5 B, fiscal 2027 adjusted EPS at \$19.53, and the average sell-side target at \$527.88 — all effectively unchanged since 28 July. The forward multiple has therefore improved for the least interesting reason available: the price fell while the estimates stood still. At \$392.43 the stock trades at 20.1x fiscal 2027 consensus earnings against 21.5x on 5 August.

That is the constructive half. The other half is that roughly a third of the decline came in a single session, and the reasons were specific rather than atmospheric. On 14 August shares fell 5.9% on 29.5 million shares, about 60% above the fifty-day average, after Bank of America was reported to have cut Broadcom's **bonds** to market weight over guarantees attached to the AI XPV financing platform built with Apollo and Blackstone. The note's headline figure — senior debt across the platform reaching roughly \$370 B by mid-2029 if it scales to its full 20-gigawatt design — is a modelled ceiling on deals not yet signed, not balance-sheet debt. The contractual number in the 10-Q is \$29 B, the cap on Broadcom's backstop of the first transaction's five-year lease payments. The distinction matters and much of the coverage lost it. What does not disappear with the distinction is the direction of travel: each new tranche the platform finances adds to that cap, and a credit desk with access to the same filing chose to act on it.

The same session carried a second, unrelated negative. CVE-2026-59310, a CVSS 9.8 directory-traversal flaw in the VMware vCenter syslog service, was confirmed to be under active exploitation — patched by Broadcom on 29 July, exploited from 3 August, with researchers counting 361 victim IP addresses across 47 countries and attributing the campaign to a suspected China-nexus actor deploying Babuk-derived ransomware. No revenue consequence is quantifiable today. The relevance is that it lands on the segment already carrying the EU antitrust inquiry and a customer base still absorbing the post-acquisition subscription repricing, and Infrastructure Software supplies roughly a third of revenue and most of the recurring cash flow.

The published levels held. The 5 August report set an ideal buy range of \$390–\$405 and told holders that new capital was better deployed into that band than committed at \$418; the stop at \$355 was never approached. Price is now inside the band and the risk/reward to the first target has widened from roughly 1.3:1 to 2.9:1. The recommendation is reaffirmed at Buy rather than upgraded, for two reasons stated in the previous report's own upgrade test: it required a pullback into the

high \$300s *with estimates still rising*, and estimates are flat rather than rising; and the fall is not purely multiple compression, because a documented new risk was priced into it.

Analytical Framework — What Drives Returns Over 1–2 Years

Five variables govern shareholder returns over the next eight quarters. First, conversion of the disclosed order book into recognised revenue and the credibility of the greater-than-\$100 B fiscal 2027 AI target. Second, customer concentration, where Google, Meta, Apple, OpenAI and Anthropic drive the overwhelming share of AI upside. Third, gross and operating margin durability as mix shifts toward custom silicon. Fourth — promoted this cycle from a footnote to a first-order variable — the scale and terms of the vendor guarantees underwriting that demand, and whether the market treats them as an enabler or a liability. Fifth, the multiple, which remains the most volatile input and the one that moved again this fortnight.

1. What Has Moved Since the Previous Report

Input	5 Aug 2026	17 Aug 2026	Read-through
Share price	\$418.28	\$392.43	–6.2%; back inside the published buy band
FY27E revenue	\$173.0 B	\$173.5 B	Unchanged; last revised 28 July
FY27E adj. EPS	\$19.49	\$19.53	Unchanged; the multiple moved, not the estimate
FY27E P/E	21.5x	20.1x	Cheaper only because price fell
Consensus target	\$527.88	\$527.88	No target revisions in the interval
Ratings mix	37 / 7 / 4 / 0	37 / 7 / 4 / 0	Strong Buy / Buy / Hold / Sell — static
Short interest	68.6 M (1.44%)	61.2 M (1.29%)	Down 10.8%; bears cut into the fall
EV / EBITDA	49.0x	45.4x	De-rated with the price
50-day average	\$394.95 (below)	\$389.94 (below)	Support now sits immediately underneath
Credit view	Not rated on	BofA bonds → market weight	New; tied to the XPV guarantee structure

Estimates as reported by S&P Global Market Intelligence (48 analysts), last forecast update 28 July 2026. Multiples are computed at the stated closing prices.

2. Business & Competitive Position

Broadcom operates two segments. Semiconductor Solutions spans custom AI accelerators, AI and datacentre networking, broadband, wireless, storage and industrial. Infrastructure Software, built around VMware and complemented by mainframe and security assets, is sold increasingly as subscription bundles with very high renewal economics. The economic engine is AI custom silicon, where Broadcom holds roughly 70% of the hyperscaler co-design market and pairs that silicon with the leading merchant Ethernet fabric. Nothing in the past fortnight touched the moat: the SerDes, packaging and networking intellectual property that makes Broadcom the default partner for a hyperscaler building its own accelerator is intact, as is the multi-generation roadmap lock-in that makes migration slow once a programme starts.

The July memorandum of understanding with Samsung, framed as exceeding \$200 B through 2030 across sub-2nm foundry, high-bandwidth memory and advanced packaging, remains the most consequential structural development of the quarter and still addresses the single-foundry dependence on TSMC that had been the franchise's most-cited vulnerability. It also remains a memorandum rather than a binding contract, and Samsung's advanced-node yields are unproven at Broadcom's required volumes. The software side is where the picture dulled. VMware Explore runs 31 August to 3 September, immediately before results, and management will be presenting a private-AI-cloud roadmap to a customer base that has just watched a critical vCenter flaw be exploited in the wild.

Peer	Relationship to Broadcom	AI Exposure	Relative Moat	Valuation
NVIDIA (NVDA)	Merchant GPU leader; the platform Broadcom customers supplement or displace	Very high	Very strong (CUDA)	Rich
Marvell (MRVL)	Direct custom-ASIC rival; the only genuine co-design competitor at scale	High	Strong	Rich
AMD (AMD)	Merchant GPU/CPU challenger; limited custom-silicon overlap	High	Moderate	Rich
Arista / Cisco	Compete in AI datacentre Ethernet switching against Broadcom silicon	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate

The durable edge is the combination of custom-silicon design share and networking attach. The persistent vulnerability is that Broadcom's largest customers retain in-house design teams and remain its most credible long-run competitors.

3. Financial Position

Metric	FY2024	FY2025	TTM (Aug 2026)	FY2026E	Comment
Revenue	\$51.6 B	\$63.9 B	\$75.5 B	\$106.0 B	+66% consensus growth
Gross margin	75.2%	77.3%	76.3%	75.1%	Mix: software + custom silicon
Operating margin	30.6%	41.3%	44.2%	—	GAAP; EBITDA margin 55.8%
Net income	\$5.9 B	\$23.1 B	\$29.3 B	\$44.2 B	FY24 hit by VMware charges
EPS	—	\$6.82*	\$6.01	\$11.63*	*adjusted; TTM is GAAP
Free cash flow	\$28.5 B	\$25.0 B	\$32.8 B	\$50.2 B	FCF margin 43.4%; capex only \$860 M
ROE / ROIC	—	—	37.3% / 24.2%	—	ROIC double the 12.1% WACC
Cash / total debt	—	—	\$19.6 / \$64.9 B	—	Debt/EBITDA 1.54x; coverage 10.6x

Fiscal year ends late October / early November. Forward figures are S&P Global consensus (43 analysts). Trailing figures are as reported through the quarter ended 3 May 2026.

The balance sheet is not the problem here and should not be confused with one. Net debt of \$45.3 B against trailing EBITDA of \$42.1 B is 1.54x, interest coverage is 10.6x and the Altman Z-score is 11.25. Free cash flow of \$32.8 B on capital expenditure of \$860 M is the defining statistic of the business model: a fabless design house with software attached, converting 43% of revenue into cash. The item that deserves more scrutiny than it usually gets is the 3.81% effective tax rate. That is an extraordinarily low charge for a US-domiciled group of this size, it is unlikely to persist, and every dollar of normalisation is a direct subtraction from forward net income that consensus may not fully carry. Reported fiscal Q2 net income of \$9.3 B was up 88% year-over-year on revenue up 48%; a meaningful part of that gap between the two growth rates is the tax line rather than operations.

The dividend of \$2.60 is a 43% payout with fifteen consecutive years of growth. Buybacks remain secondary and share count is up 1.04% year-over-year, so the shareholder yield is mildly negative at -0.37%. Broadcom is compounding through the business, not through the share count.

4. The Financing Structure — What Is Actually Committed

This is the section the previous report opened and the market has now repriced, so it is worth separating the documented from the modelled. The AI XPV Platform launched in June with Apollo and Blackstone, opening with a \$35 B financing package led by Apollo and designed to enable more than 20 gigawatts of compute for frontier AI labs through 2028. Anthropic and OpenAI are the named customers. Outside investors buy the racks built on Broadcom's custom accelerators, the labs lease them, and Broadcom backstops much of the financing — which lets the company book very

large orders without its customers funding them up front.

Figure	Amount	Status and what it actually represents
10-Q backstop cap, first transaction	\$29 B	Contractual. Maximum exposure on the five-year lease guarantee arranged 8 June. Grows as racks deploy, shrinks as the customer pays. Broadcom can assume the lease or sell the racks on default.
Modelled loss, total default	~\$42 B	Sell-side estimate. BofA's figure for the full platform if every customer defaulted at once, net of assumed rack recovery.
Modelled loss, 25% default	~\$10.5 B	Sell-side estimate. The more useful number for scenario work; roughly \$2.21 per share.
Platform senior debt, mid-2029	~\$370 B	Modelled ceiling. What BofA gets if the platform scales to its full 20 GW design. Not Broadcom debt, and not signed. Reported ~\$150 B of net new supply in 2027 alone.

The honest reading sits between the two loudest interpretations. The \$370 B headline is not a liability and treating it as one is wrong; a total wipeout on the committed \$29 B would cost roughly nine months of profit at the current run rate, painful but survivable. Equally, the structure has changed the character of the business. Broadcom is now partly financing demand for its own chips, its counterparties are unrated private AI labs whose lease payments depend on the build-out staying funded, and the committed number rises with every tranche. The bear case is no longer only that orders slow — it is that orders slow while Broadcom is standing behind the leases on hardware already shipped. That is a correlated exposure, and correlated exposures are what turn ordinary downturns into severe ones.

5. Growth Drivers and Key Risks

Catalyst	Horizon	Likelihood	Impact
Q3 FY2026 results, 2 September (AMC) — the near-term binary	Immediate	Certain	Very High
AI XPU ramp toward the >\$100 B FY2027 target	Short–Med	High	Very High
Order book: >\$30 B of AI bookings against \$10.8 B shipped in FQ2	Short–Med	High	High
AI Ethernet and networking attach on every cluster shipped	Short	High	High
Samsung sub-2nm / HBM partnership converting from MOU to volume	Med	Medium	High
VMware subscription conversion and margin lift	Short–Med	Medium	Medium

Risk	Type	Probability	Severity	Change vs 5 Aug
Vendor-guarantee exposure to unrated AI customers; committed cap rises with each tranche	Financial	High	High	Worse
Valuation — 65.3x trailing; forward case rests on consensus being delivered	Valuation	High	High	Better
Consensus FY27 revenue of \$173.5 B proves too optimistic	Estimate	Medium	High	Unchanged
Customer concentration; hyperscalers in-source XPU design	Competitive	Medium	High	Unchanged
VMware security exposure — CVE-2026-59310 exploited in the wild	Operational	Medium	Medium	New

Risk	Type	Probability	Severity	Change vs 5 Aug
EU antitrust action on VMware licensing practices	Regulatory	Medium	Medium	Unchanged
AI capex digestion or a cyclical air-pocket in orders	Industry	Medium	High	Unchanged
Effective tax rate of 3.81% normalises toward statutory	Financial	Medium	Medium	Unchanged
Single-foundry dependence on TSMC	Operational	Low	High	Unchanged

Valuation risk eased with the price. Everything else was flat or worse, and the two items that moved against the company both sit in segments that were already carrying pressure. On balance the risk profile deteriorated modestly, which is why the Risk score falls even as the Valuation score rises.

6. Valuation

At \$392.43 Broadcom trades at 65.3x trailing GAAP earnings, 33.7x consensus fiscal 2026 adjusted EPS of \$11.63, and 20.1x consensus fiscal 2027 adjusted EPS of \$19.53. Enterprise value to trailing EBITDA is 45.4x and price to trailing free cash flow is 57.0x, falling to roughly 37.3x on the fiscal 2026 free-cash-flow estimate of \$50.2 B. The PEG ratio of 0.52 makes the stock look inexpensive, but PEG is arithmetic applied to a growth rate that must be delivered rather than one that has been observed. The characterisation from the last report still holds and has simply become less demanding: Broadcom is not expensive against consensus, and is expensive against anything else.

What consensus asks for has not softened. Fiscal 2026 revenue of \$106.0 B and fiscal 2027 of \$173.5 B require two consecutive years of better than 60% growth from a base above \$60 B, which would be close to unprecedented at this scale. The scenarios below therefore continue to haircut consensus in the base case rather than adopt it, and apply an earnings multiple appropriate to the growth each scenario implies rather than one multiple throughout. The bear case has been reduced this cycle to carry the financing exposure explicitly.

Scenario	Prob.	FY27 Revenue	FY27 Adj. EPS	Multiple	Fair Value	Path
Bull	26%	~\$180 B	~\$20.50	30x	\$615	Consensus met or beaten; margins hold; guarantee structure read as an enabler and the multiple re-rates
Base	50%	~\$160 B	~\$18.25	26x	\$475	Ramp roughly on plan but below consensus; multiple stable; no guarantee is called
Bear	24%	~\$120 B	~\$13.00	19x	\$245	Capex digestion or in-sourcing; estimates and multiple compress together, plus ~\$10.5 B of backstop loss at a 25% default rate

Probabilities sum to 100%. The bear fair value is derived as $19x \times \$13.00 = \$247.00$ less \$10.5 B of modelled backstop loss spread over 4.76 B shares (\$2.21), giving \$244.79, rounded to \$245 — the analyst's own calculation from the stated inputs, not a company or consensus figure. The probability-weighted fair value is **\$456**, approximately 16.3% above the current price, against 11% at the previous review. Fair values are analytical estimates, not price predictions. The sell-side distribution remains extraordinarily wide — targets from \$215.88 to \$675 against an average of \$527.88 — which is itself evidence that the outcome is genuinely uncertain.

7. Market Sentiment and Positioning

Indicator	Reading	Interpretation
Analyst consensus	Strong Buy; 37 Strong Buy, 7 Buy, 4 Hold, 0 Sell	Unchanged through the sell-off; no rating cuts
Average price target	\$527.88 (+34.5%); range \$215.88–\$675	Implied upside widened purely on the lower price

Indicator	Reading	Interpretation
Recent actions	J.P. Morgan \$580, Bernstein \$550, Morgan Stanley \$502	All late July; nothing revised in the interval
Credit view	BofA cut bonds to market weight	The proximate cause of the 14 August fall
Short interest	61.2 M shares, 1.29% of shares out	Down 10.8% from 68.6 M — bears covered into weakness
Institutional ownership	79.94% of shares outstanding	High and stable
Q2 13F disclosures (14 Aug)	Tiger Global –51%; Point72 reduced	Positioning as of 30 June; backward-looking but unhelpful optics
Insider ownership	1.11%; executives persistent net sellers	Largely programmatic; monitor
News flow (moomoo digest)	Net negative, mixed on the margin	Security and financing dominate; order book supportive

The most informative line is short interest. A 10.8% reduction across a fortnight in which the stock fell 6.2% says the decline was driven by holders selling rather than by new bears arriving. Combined with the 13F disclosures showing large funds trimming through the June quarter, the picture is of long positioning being reduced. That is a less alarming signal than a short-driven break, but it does mean the marginal institutional buyer for AI infrastructure is no longer automatic — the same structural point the Goldman conviction-list removal made a fortnight ago.

8. Technical Setup

Indicator	Value	Reading	Versus 5 Aug report
Price	\$392.43	—	\$418.28 (–6.2%)
SMA 20	\$400.20	Price 1.9% below — short-term trend lost	Was above
SMA 50	\$389.94	Price 0.6% above — the line being defended	Was above
SMA 100	\$393.50	Price 0.3% below — effectively at the line	Was above
EMA 20 / EMA 50	\$402.06 / \$396.28	Price below both	Was above both
SMA 200	\$369.30	Price 6.3% above — primary uptrend intact	Not computed then
RSI (14)	46.2	Neutral; no oversold signal yet	61.8
MACD (12,26,9)	5.05 / signal 5.96	Histogram –0.91; bearish crossover	Was +4.25 bullish
ATR (14)	\$16.01 (4.1%)	Elevated daily volatility	\$17.07 (4.1%)
Volume 20d / 50d	18.4 M / 24.7 M	14 Aug traded 29.5 M — 1.6x the 50-day	19.8 M / 28.0 M
20-day range	\$369.51–\$432.73	Failed at the June gap zone, then reversed	\$357.80–\$427.00

Indicators computed directly from the daily OHLCV series of 100 sessions (25 March – 17 August 2026). The 200-day average requires a longer series than was retrievable and is taken from S&P Global Market Intelligence at \$369.30 rather than computed here; it is labelled accordingly.

The chart has given back essentially everything it gained in the previous fortnight. Broadcom failed at the \$419–\$427 June gap zone flagged as resistance last time, reversed, and has now lost the 20-day, the 100-day and both short exponential averages; the MACD crossover that was confirmed on 5 August has inverted. What remains intact matters more than what broke. Price is still 6.3% above a rising 200-day average, the 17 July swing low at \$357.80 has not been threatened, and the 50-day at \$389.94 sits directly beneath the current price as the first line of defence. RSI at 46.2 is neutral rather than oversold, which means the pullback has room to extend without becoming a capitulation. Support runs \$390, then \$369, then \$358. Resistance is now the cluster at \$400–\$402, then \$427, then the June high of \$495. Technicals inform timing only and do not override the fundamental view.

9. Scorecard

Component	Score	1–10 (10 = best)	Wt.	Δ	Rationale
Business Quality	9		15%	—	Elite dual-engine franchise; AI silicon plus sticky software
Financial Strength	8		15%	—	76% gross margin, \$32.8 B FCF; 1.54x leverage, 10.6x coverage
Competitive Advantage	9		15%	—	~70% custom-ASIC design share; multi-generation lock-in
Management	8		10%	—	Exceptional allocator; financing role adds complexity but no new action
Growth Potential	9		15%	—	Order book, TPU and Samsung programmes underwrite the ramp
Valuation	5		15%	+1	20.1x FY27 from 21.5x; cheaper on price, not on estimates
Risk (10 = lowest risk)	4		10%	-1	Guarantee cap rises per tranche; VMware zero-day exploited
Technical Setup	5		5%	-1	Lost 20/100-day and both EMAs; MACD crossover inverted

Scored 1–10, where 10 is always best, including Risk. Bar length is proportional to the score, so a longer bar is always the better outcome on every row. **Weighted investment score: 74.5 / 100**, down from 75 on 5 August. Three components moved and they partly offset: Valuation rose from 4 to 5 as the forward multiple fell, while Risk fell from 5 to 4 on the financing and security developments and Technical Setup fell from 7 to 5 as the averages were lost. The previous report's scorecard used the same direction convention — its Risk score of 5 entered the composite uninverted and reproduces its stated total of 75 exactly — so the two are directly comparable and no restatement was required.

10. Recommendation — BUY (Moderate Conviction, Reaffirmed)

The recommendation is unchanged and, unusually, so is the reasoning: the previous report argued that Broadcom was worth owning but that \$418 was the wrong price to commit new capital, and nominated \$390–\$405 as the band to buy into. Price is now \$392.43. The instruction has been executed by the market rather than superseded. Upside to the first target has widened from 19.5% to 27.4% and the risk/reward from roughly 1.3:1 to 2.9:1, entirely because the stop can stay anchored to an unbroken structural low while the entry improved.

ENTRY (SPOT)	IDEAL BUY RANGE	CUT-LOSS	RISK / REWARD
\$392.43	\$365 – \$392	\$355	~2.9 : 1
TAKE-PROFIT 1	TAKE-PROFIT 2	HOLDING HORIZON	POSITION SIZE
\$500	\$560	12 – 24 months	3 – 4% of portfolio

Published level	5 Aug report	This report	Reason for the change
Ideal buy range	\$390 – \$405	\$365 – \$392	The 20/100-day cluster that anchored the old band is now overhead resistance; band reset to run from spot down toward the 200-day at \$369
Cut-loss	\$355	\$355	Unchanged. Still sits just below the 17 July swing low of \$357.80, which was never approached
Take-profit 1	\$500	\$500	Unchanged. Base-case fair value of \$475 still brackets it and estimates did not move
Take-profit 2	\$560	\$560	Unchanged. Bull case of \$615 on \$180 B FY27 revenue at 30x

Expected upside is 27.4% to the first target and 42.7% to the second, against 9.5% downside to the stop — roughly 2.9:1 and 4.5:1 respectively. Three of the four published levels are unchanged, which is the point: the trade plan set on 5 August

did not need rescuing, it needed the price to come to it. The practical implication is the inverse of last time. New capital can now be committed at spot rather than waited on, preferably in instalments, with room reserved to add toward \$369 if the 2 September print disappoints.

What would change the view. An upgrade toward Strong Buy would require the 2 September results to show fiscal 2027 AI revenue tracking above \$100 B with gross margin intact, or a further fall into the \$360s with estimates still unrevised — the condition the last report set was a pullback into the high \$300s *with estimates rising*, and only half of that has occurred. A downgrade to Hold or Watchlist would follow evidence of AI order digestion, a flagship hyperscaler bringing XPU design in-house, gross-margin erosion below the low seventies, a material cut to fiscal 2027 consensus, disclosure that the committed guarantee cap has risen materially beyond \$29 B without a commensurate rise in the order book, or a decisive break below \$357.80 on rising volume.

11. Final Verdict

Would an investor commit their own capital to Broadcom at \$392 today? Yes, and with modestly more conviction than at \$418 three weeks ago, though the improvement is narrower than the price move alone suggests. The operating case is untouched: consensus did not move, no analyst cut a target, the order book disclosed in June showed more than \$30 B of AI bookings against \$10.8 B shipped, the Samsung arrangement still addresses the foundry concentration that was the franchise's most-cited weakness, and the company converts 43% of revenue into free cash flow at a 24% return on invested capital against a 12% cost of capital. Those attributes are not ordinary and a 6% fall did not touch any of them.

The single biggest concern has shifted. A fortnight ago it was that the valuation argument had become circular — the stock looked reasonable on fiscal 2027 earnings only if fiscal 2027 earnings arrived as forecast. That remains true and the arithmetic has improved only because the price fell. But the sharper worry now is the second circularity underneath it: Broadcom is helping finance the demand it books. The committed number is \$29 B and the \$370 B headline is a modelled ceiling on unsigned deals, so the panic was overdone. The structural point is not. If the AI build-out slows, Broadcom does not merely lose orders, it stands behind leases on hardware already delivered to unrated counterparties, and those two exposures fail together rather than independently. A credit desk looking at the same 10-Q chose to downgrade the bonds. That deserves weight, not dismissal.

The thesis is invalidated by decelerating AI bookings, a cut to fiscal 2027 consensus, gross-margin erosion, the loss of a flagship XPU programme, or a guarantee cap that grows faster than the order book. Held at 3–4% of a portfolio, accumulated in instalments rather than at once, with a defined stop at \$355 and capacity reserved to add toward the 200-day average, the risk/reward is better than it has been at any point since the previous two reports were written. Results on 2 September will settle more of this than any further analysis of the current price can. It remains a Buy, and still not a table-pounding one.

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