

EQUITY RESEARCH | COVERAGE REVIEW

Airbnb, Inc.

NASDAQ: ABNB | September 20, 2026 | Published levels reviewed against the August 31 report

RECOMMENDATION	Last Price (Sep 18)	Fair Value	Fwd P/E Score
WATCHLIST	\$166.22	\$158–178	33.9x 72.5
Reaffirmed. Trigger touched, not converted	–12.3% since Aug 31 report	Weighted ~\$167	Was 38.7x prior 70.5

The Published Trigger Was Touched

The August 31 review rated Airbnb Watchlist at \$189.43 and named one price at which the shares would become a buy: a retracement into \$155–168, a zone drawn from the unfilled August gap and the then-rising fifty-day average, corresponding to roughly 32–34 times FY26 estimated earnings. Three weeks later the stock closed at \$166.22. That is inside the zone, and on the same FY26 estimate of approximately \$4.90 it is 33.9 times earnings, inside the stated multiple band. Both limbs of the published condition have been satisfied.

They have been satisfied at the outer edge of each, and the rating is nonetheless being reaffirmed rather than upgraded. That requires an explanation rather than an assertion, because a research note that names a level and then declines to honour it when the level arrives is worth very little. The explanation is not that the stock failed to fall far enough. It is that fair value fell to meet the price. Between August 31 and September 18 the Federal Reserve raised rates for the first time in three years with at least one more increase in its own projections, the ten-year Treasury yield moved to 4.94%, and the only true listed comparable de-rated harder than Airbnb did. The multiple the market will pay for online travel earnings has come down, and the level that looked like a discount when it was written now looks like the price.

What follows sets out that arithmetic, and states plainly where the trigger now sits so that the goalposts are visible rather than quietly moved.

What Actually Moved Since August 31

Item	August 31 report	September 18	Read
Share price	\$189.43 (Aug 28 close)	\$166.22 (Sep 18 close)	–12.3%; no company-specific cause
Position vs fair value	5.2% above the \$165–180 range	Inside a revised \$158–178	Gap closed from the price side
Forward P/E on ~\$4.90 FY26E	38.7x	33.9x	The binding constraint has loosened
Booking Holdings forward P/E	~18x	15.1x	Peer de-rated 16%; Airbnb 12%
Consensus average target	\$176.76, 6.3% below spot	\$182.98, 10.1% above spot	Sentiment argument has reversed
Rating mix	14 Buy / 25 Hold / 6 Sell	26 Buy / 16 Hold / 3 Sell	Street moved decisively to the bulls
Fed funds target	3.50–3.75%	3.75–4.00%, more signalled	First hike in three years, Sep 16
SMA 50	\$158.77	\$167.01	Recomputed; risen to meet the price
RSI(14)	67.8	40.3	From cooling to outright weak
MACD histogram	–0.33, first negative cross	–2.66, line below zero	Downtrend confirmed, not a base

Item	August 31 report	September 18	Read
Insider selling	~\$202M over three weeks	~\$2.6M over the last week	Materially decelerated
US fee migration	Hard September 15 deadline	Completed for non-EEA hosts	EEA and Switzerland run to Oct 13

Price and technical figures computed from 300 completed daily sessions of Twelve Data OHLCV through September 18 2026; the price of record is the September 18 close of \$166.22 from Alpha Vantage. Consensus target, rating mix and peer multiple from StockAnalysis.com, September 18–19 2026. Policy rate and yield figures from the Federal Open Market Committee statement of September 16 2026 and the Treasury daily par yield curve. Forward P/E uses this report's FY26E diluted EPS of approximately \$4.90, carried forward from the August 8 report and derived from company guidance; it is not a company figure. Published consensus FY26 EPS is higher at \$5.30, on which the shares trade at 31.4x.

Why the Price Fell, and Why It Matters That Nothing Broke

The decline has no company-specific cause, and that is the most useful single fact in this review. Airbnb has not reported since the second quarter, has not revised guidance, and disclosed nothing adverse in the interval. The news flow across the period was, if anything, favourable: Raymond James upgraded to Outperform with a \$200 target on September 8, Rosenblatt initiated at Buy with \$220, Baird and Citizens both moved to \$200, Deutsche Bank called the company a clear artificial-intelligence winner, and Gordon Haskett and Truist raised targets from \$146 and \$134 respectively. One item captured the disconnect exactly: on September 8 the shares slid 3.4% on a day that carried fresh bullish calls and nothing else.

The cause sits one level up. The Federal Open Market Committee raised its target range by 25 basis points to 3.75–4.00% on September 16, a unanimous vote and the first increase in three years, with its own projections carrying at least one more before year end. Equity markets had been discounting that outcome since the September 10 producer price report, and the S&P 500 recorded seven losses in eight sessions into the decision. Consumer discretionary and travel names carried more than their share of it. Airbnb fell with its sector, from the top of a three-week range, on no news of its own.

A de-rating with no fundamental cause is exactly the condition under which a price trigger is supposed to convert. The qualification is that the same event which pushed the price down also raised the rate at which every future dollar of Airbnb's earnings is discounted, and did so while the company's closest comparable fell further. A trigger written against one discount rate does not automatically survive a change in that rate, and the next two sections test whether this one does.

Valuation at \$166.22

At \$166.22 against 589.6 million shares outstanding, market capitalisation is approximately \$98.0 billion. Netting \$12.07 billion of cash and short-term investments against \$2.50 billion of senior notes gives net cash of \$9.57 billion and an enterprise value of roughly \$88.4 billion. The share count is 7.4 million lower than the weighted diluted figure used in August, which is the buyback working. Every multiple below has moved in the buyer's favour, and the direction of travel is the opposite of the last two reviews.

Method	Input	Now	Aug 31	Read
Trailing P/E	\$98.0B / \$2.69B TTM net income	36.4x	42.0x	Still flattered by discrete tax items
Forward P/E	\$166.22 / ~\$4.90 FY26E EPS	33.9x	38.7x	Inside the published 32–34x band
Forward P/E, consensus	\$166.22 / \$5.30 FY26E consensus	31.4x	35.7x	The street's own basis
EV / Adj. EBITDA	\$88.4B EV / \$4.62B TTM	19.1x	22.4x	Reasonable for a mid-teens grower
EV / FCF	\$88.4B EV / \$4.86B TTM	18.2x	21.4x	5.5% yield; part is booking float
EV / Sales	\$88.4B EV / \$13.16B TTM	6.72x	7.87x	Still a premium to both listed peers

Method	Input	Now	Aug 31	Read
PEG (forward)	33.9x vs ~20% EPS growth	1.70	1.93	Booking now near 1.2
Scenario-weighted	Section below	\$167.00	\$172.65	Spot now 0.5% below , was 8.9% above

Market capitalisation, enterprise value and all multiples are this report's calculations from the Q2 2026 Form 10-Q and subsequent disclosures, using the September 18 2026 closing price of \$166.22 from Alpha Vantage. Share count, cash, debt and trailing figures cross-checked against StockAnalysis.com as of September 19 2026. Balance-sheet items are as of June 30 2026. FY26E EPS of \$4.90 is derived from company guidance and is not a company-reported measure; the consensus line uses the published \$5.30. The August 31 consensus-basis multiple of 35.7x is computed here for comparability and did not appear in that report.

The peer comparison is the one test the shares still fail, and it has become marginally harder rather than easier. Booking Holdings grew trailing revenue 12.9% and trades at 15.1 times forward earnings. Airbnb grew 15.8% on consensus for the current year and trades at 33.9 times on this report's estimate, or 31.4 on the street's. That is roughly 2.2 times the peer multiple for roughly 1.2 times the growth rate. In August the same comparison read 2.15 times the multiple, so the premium widened even as Airbnb's own multiple contracted, because Booking fell 16% on its forward multiple against Airbnb's 12%. The August report declined to pay more than double the peer multiple for optionality that remained unquantified. Nothing in the intervening three weeks has quantified it, and the ratio has not improved. Declining again is the consistent position, not a new one.

Macro: the two variables that actually drive this business

Airbnb carries net cash and no demand that is financed at the margin, so the policy rate reaches it through the discount rate rather than through the revenue line. The two variables that genuinely move the business are discretionary consumer spending and the cost of getting to the property, and both currently point the wrong way beneath a strong headline. August retail sales rose 1.2% on the month against a 0.8% forecast and 6.0% over the year, which is a consumer accelerating in nominal terms. Underneath it, real personal consumption was effectively flat in July, average hourly earnings are running 3.1% against headline inflation of 3.4% so real pay is still falling, the saving rate sits at 3.0%, and the Conference Board's expectations index is at 68.2, well inside the zone the Board associates with recession within a year. Consumers are describing an economy they expect to weaken while still spending into it.

The second variable is energy. Gasoline rose 3.9% in August alone and is up 27.4% over twelve months, with the broader energy index up 16.3% and West Texas Intermediate holding near \$102 on Strait of Hormuz risk. Travel is a bundle, and the accommodation line competes for the same wallet as the airfare and the tank of fuel. A household whose real income is flat and whose fuel bill is a quarter higher than a year ago does not stop travelling, but it trades down, shortens trips and books later. That is the specific channel through which a macro slowdown reaches nights booked, and it is the reason the bear probability in the scenario table below has been raised.

Sentiment: The Argument That Actually Reversed

The August report made a specific sentiment case against the shares: the stock traded above the consensus of the analysts covering it, which meant it already discounted the optimistic half of their range. That condition no longer holds, and its reversal is the strongest single item in the bull column. The consensus average target has risen to \$182.98 while the price has fallen to \$166.22, so the shares now trade 10.1% below the mean of the street rather than 6.3% above it. The rating mix moved with it, from 14 buy-equivalents against 25 holds and 6 sells to 26 against 16 and 3. The median analyst, which had not moved in August, has now moved.

Signal	Reading	Interpretation
Consensus average target	\$182.98, 10.1% above the last close	Reversed from 6.3% below spot in August
Rating mix (45 analysts)	21 Strong Buy, 5 Buy, 16 Hold, 1 Sell, 2 Strong Sell	Majority now recommending purchase

Signal	Reading	Interpretation
Target range	High \$220, low \$125	Dispersion remains unusually wide
Upgrades in the window	Raymond James to Outperform (\$200), Rosenblatt initiated Buy (\$220), Baird and Citizens to \$200	Upgrade cycle continued into the drawdown
The dissent	Morgan Stanley assumed coverage Equal-Weight, \$170, September 16	A major house sees the shares at roughly fair value
Insider activity	~\$2.6M disclosed in the last week against ~\$202M in the prior three	Selling pressure has largely exhausted itself
Company capital allocation	\$250M below-market housing finance commitment, September 14	Small relative to \$9.57B net cash; a regulatory hedge
Next catalyst	Q3 results, scheduled November 5	Tougher comparisons; first partial fee-migration read

Consensus average target, rating mix and target range from StockAnalysis.com as of September 18 2026, sourced there to S&P Global Market Intelligence and TipRanks. Individual analyst actions and Form 4 and Rule 144 filings from moomoo news and notice aggregation, September 8–18 2026. Housing commitment per HousingWire and the Wall Street Journal, September 14 2026.

Two items deserve weighing against each other rather than in isolation. Morgan Stanley assuming coverage at Equal-Weight with a \$170 target is a considered judgment from a large house that the shares are worth roughly what they cost, which is close to the conclusion this report reaches by a different route. Against it, the collapse in insider selling is a genuine change in tone. The August review flagged roughly \$202 million of sales and notices in three weeks as the only cohort with an information advantage transacting in one direction. In the most recent week the disclosed figure is roughly \$2.6 million across two filings. Insiders who sold heavily between \$180 and \$190 have largely stopped selling at \$166. That is not a buy signal, but it removes an item that was previously in the bear column.

The \$250 million housing commitment is worth a sentence for what it signals rather than for what it costs. Airbnb will provide below-market, last-dollar financing to stalled rental developments, seeded with \$6.4 million in Austin, and expects the capital to unlock more than \$5 billion of housing investment over a decade. At 2.6% of net cash the financial effect is immaterial. The strategic effect is that the company is addressing the affordability argument that underpins short-term-rental restrictions in its most supply-constrained markets, which is the risk row in this report with the highest probability attached to it.

Technical Position

Every moving average below has been recomputed from a fresh 300-session series rather than carried forward, which matters because the fifty-day average anchored one edge of the published trigger zone. In August it stood at \$158.77 and was described as rising. It has risen to \$167.01. The price at \$166.22 has therefore not descended to that anchor so much as the anchor has climbed to the price, and the two met a fraction below it. The unfilled gap that formed the other edge, \$153.79 to \$163.45, has not been touched: the lowest print of the decline was \$164.80 on September 18. Re-derived today from the same two structures, the zone would read \$153.79 to \$167.01, which is materially the band that was published. The trigger has not been invalidated by its own construction.

What the series does show is a genuine deterioration in the setup. The shares sit below the twenty-day, fifty-day and both short exponential averages, RSI has fallen from 67.8 to 40.3, and the MACD line is below zero at -1.38 with the histogram at -2.66, a far more decisive bearish configuration than the marginal cross flagged in August. Twenty-day volume has slipped below the fifty-day. This is a downtrend in progress rather than a base forming, and the unfilled gap sits 1% to 7% below. One number improves the longer view: with a 300-session series the two-hundred-day average is computable for the first time in this coverage at \$141.81, and the price remains 17.2% above it. The multi-year uptrend is intact; the medium-term one is not.

Indicator	Value	Read	Indicator	Value	Read
Price (Sep 18)	\$166.22	At the fifty-day	RSI(14)	40.3	Weak, not oversold
SMA 20	\$178.34	−6.8%	MACD line	−1.38	Below zero
SMA 50	\$167.01	−0.5%	MACD signal	+1.28	Histogram −2.66
SMA 100	\$152.61	+8.9%	ATR(14)	\$4.82 (2.9%)	Unchanged in percent
SMA 200	\$141.81	+17.2%	Vol 20d vs 50d	4.5M vs 4.6M	Participation fading
EMA 20 / 50	\$173.29 / \$167.68	Below both	Unfilled gap	\$153.79–163.45	Still open, 1–7% below


Indicators computed in code from 300 completed sessions of daily OHLCV through September 18 2026 (Twelve Data), using Wilder smoothing for RSI and ATR and an SMA-seeded EMA. All distances are measured against the \$166.22 price of record. The two-hundred-day average was reported as not computed in the August review because that series ran to only 100 sessions; it is computed here and is not an estimate.

Risk Assessment

Risk	Type	Probability	Severity	Comment
Discretionary travel demand softens	Macro	Medium-High	High	Raised. Fed tightening into flat real consumption and fuel up 27% Y/Y
Multiple compression from ~34x forward	Valuation	Medium	High	Reduced from August; 34x is not 39x, but the peer gap is unchanged
Tougher H2 comparisons management flagged	Company	High	Medium	Q3 Adj. EBITDA margin already guided down Y/Y; reports November 5
Take rate stays flat into 2027	Company	Medium	High	Removes the monetisation leg of the premium; no update since Q2
Fee migration disrupts host pricing or supply	Company	Medium	Medium	US completed September 15; EEA runs to October 13; no data yet
Short-term-rental regulation constrains supply	Regulatory	High	Medium	EU data rules, NYC, Barcelona 2028; housing fund is a partial hedge
AI travel agents disintermediate discovery	Competitive	Medium	High	Management's own stated existential risk; cuts both ways
Earnings quality: discrete tax and investment items	Financial	High	Low-Med	Recurring; headline figures need adjusting each quarter
Concentrated insider selling	Governance	Low	Low	Downgraded. Roughly \$2.6M in the last week against \$202M prior

Against that list sits a balance sheet that removes financial risk almost entirely: \$9.57 billion of net cash, investment-grade ratings from S&P and Moody's, and roughly \$3.4 billion remaining on a \$6.0 billion buyback authorisation that reduced the share count by 7.4 million in the quarter to date. Airbnb cannot be forced into a bad decision by its creditors, and it is repurchasing stock into the decline. The Risk score sits mid-scale because two of its components moved in opposite directions: valuation risk has genuinely fallen with the multiple, while macroeconomic risk to discretionary travel has genuinely risen with the policy rate.

Scorecard

Component	Score	vs prior	Comment
Business Quality	 8/10	—	Asset-light marketplace, elite cash conversion, cyclical demand
Financial Strength	 9/10	—	\$9.57B net cash, investment grade, buying back stock into weakness
Competitive Advantage	 8/10	—	Hotel crossover and core-market re-acceleration intact; nothing new
Management	 8/10	—	Guidance accuracy still the strongest evidence; insider selling has stopped
Growth Potential	 8/10	—	FY guide unchanged since Q2; consensus FY26 revenue growth 15.8%
Valuation	 5/10	+2	33.9x forward and at weighted fair value, against 5.2% above the range
Risk (10 = lowest risk)	 6/10	—	Valuation risk down, macro risk up; net unchanged
Technical Setup	 3/10	-2	Below the 20- and 50-day, MACD below zero, RSI 40

Scored 1–10, where 10 is always best, including Risk. Weights: Business Quality 15, Financial Strength 15, Competitive Advantage 15, Management 10, Growth Potential 15, Valuation 15, Risk 10, Technical Setup 5. The August 31 report labelled its Risk row the same way and used the same direction, so no restatement was required to compare the two. Weighted total computed in code: 72.5 / 100, against 70.5 previously.

Two components moved and they move against each other, which is the honest shape of this review. Valuation improves from 3 to 5 because a 12.3% decline on an unchanged and slightly upgraded earnings base has taken the shares from 5.2% above the top of a fair value range to a fraction below the probability-weighted centre of one. Technical Setup falls from 5 to 3 because the sideways digestion described in August resolved downward rather than upward, leaving price below every short and medium average with the MACD line beneath zero. The composite rises two points, and a rising composite alongside an unchanged rating is the correct outcome for a business that became cheaper without becoming cheap.

Recommendation: Watchlist (reaffirmed)

The rating is unchanged and the reasoning behind it has materially changed, which is a different statement from a routine reaffirmation and should be read as one. In August the objection was that the price had run 6.4% further above a fair value range that had just been raised, on no new information. That objection has been answered by the market: the shares are 12.3% lower and now sit essentially on top of this report's probability-weighted fair value of \$167.00. The objection that survives is narrower and older. Airbnb trades at roughly 2.2 times Booking Holdings' forward multiple for roughly 1.2 times its growth rate, a ratio that has not improved since August and in fact widened slightly, because the peer de-rated further than Airbnb did. The optionality in hotels, services and artificial intelligence that justifies some premium remains entirely unquantified, and the September appearance at the Goldman Sachs technology conference produced expansive commentary about new markets without a single number attached to share of nights, revenue contribution or conversion uplift.

The arithmetic that results is symmetric, and symmetry is not a buy. The bull case carries 26.9% upside, the bear case 27.2% downside, and the probability-weighted centre sits 0.5% above the last close. A recommendation to commit capital requires a margin of safety that compensates for the risks being taken, and at fair value there is none to take, in a quarter that lands on November 5 against comparisons management itself flagged as tougher and a margin it has

already guided down year over year.

The published trigger of \$155–168 is therefore left where it was rather than tightened, because the technical structures it was drawn from re-derive to the same band today. What is stated instead, plainly, is the second condition that was always implicit in it and is now explicit: the price alone no longer converts the rating at the top of that band. The shares entered it from above, at fair value rather than at a discount, because fair value came down to meet them. Conversion now requires either the lower half of the band, which would restore a genuine discount to the weighted fair value, or the peer premium narrowing, or one of the unquantified growth legs acquiring a number.

What would change the view	Trigger	Status
Upgrade to BUY on price	The lower half of the standing \$155–168 band, which is also the unfilled gap, restoring a double-digit discount to the \$167 weighted fair value	Band entered at its top edge; not converted. Low of the decline was \$164.80
Upgrade to BUY on relative value	The forward multiple premium to Booking Holdings narrowing materially from the current ~2.2 times, through either Airbnb de-rating further or the peer re-rating	Widened from 2.15x in August; the objection is unchanged
Upgrade to BUY on fundamentals	2027 implied take rate guided up, or the completed fee migration disclosed with a quantified revenue effect	Open; first partial read at Q3 on November 5, clean read at Q4
Upgrade on execution	AI search graduating from opt-in toggle to default with a disclosed conversion uplift, or the AI host-pricing rollout quantified	Open; commentary at Communacopia carried no figures
Upgrade on disclosure	Hotels reported with a stated share of nights and a revenue contribution rather than a relative growth rate	Open; the September venue passed without it
Downgrade to AVOID	Nights growth falling back to high single digits, a Q3 miss against the already-lowered margin bar, or evidence the take rate is declining rather than merely flat	Not triggered
Downgrade on macro	A sustained deterioration in real consumer spending alongside further increases in fuel costs and a continuing policy tightening path	Watching. Real PCE flat in July; expectations index at 68.2

No entry, cut-loss or take-profit levels are published because the rating is not Buy. For position-sizing purposes, an existing holder has less reason to act on this review than on the last one: the multiple that drove the objection has compressed by five turns and the stock is repurchasing itself into the weakness. The case against remains about the marginal dollar rather than the invested one.

Scenario Analysis

Scenario	Prob.	Revenue outlook	Earnings / margin	Fair value
Bull	25%	FY26 at the top of mid-teens; FY27 revenue ~\$16.8B (+17%) as AI search converts, hotels reach mid-single-digit share of nights and the completed fee migration lifts GBV through host pass-through	FY27 EPS ~\$6.60; Adj. EBITDA margin ~37%; 32x	\$205–218
Base	50%	FY26 ~\$14.2B (+15.8%) in line with consensus; FY27 ~\$16.2B (+14%) with nights in the high single digits to 10% and a flat-to-slightly-up take rate	FY27 EPS ~\$6.00; margin ~36%; 28x, reflecting the higher discount rate and the peer de-rating	\$158–178

Scenario	Prob.	Revenue outlook	Earnings / margin	Fair value
Bear	25%	Second-half comparisons bite as management flagged; tightening into flat real consumption and 27% higher fuel costs softens discretionary travel; host churn around the fee migration dents supply growth	FY27 EPS ~\$5.25; margin ~34%; de-rates toward the peer at 23x	\$115–128

Probability-weighted fair value: $0.25 \times \$211 + 0.50 \times \$168 + 0.25 \times \$121 = \$167.00$, roughly 0.5% above the \$166.22 close, against 8.9% above the close in the August report. Probabilities sum to 100%. Three adjustments were made to the August distribution and each is stated rather than buried. The bear probability rises from 23% to 25% and the bull falls from 27% to 25%, because the Federal Reserve has begun tightening into a consumer whose real spending was flat in July and whose expectations index sits at 68.2. The base-case FY27 earnings estimate rises from approximately \$5.75 to \$6.00, because consensus FY26 EPS at \$5.30 is above the \$4.90 this coverage has carried and the base it compounds from is therefore higher. The base-case multiple falls from 30x to 28x, because the ten-year Treasury yield is 4.94% and Booking Holdings' forward multiple fell from roughly 18x to 15.1x over the same three weeks. The first two adjustments roughly offset; the third is what holds fair value close to flat while the price fell 12%.

Final Verdict

Would this be worth committing personal capital to at \$166.22? Not yet, and the gap between not yet and yes is now genuinely narrow, which is a meaningful change from the last two reviews. Airbnb is a high-quality, cash-generative, net-cash marketplace that re-accelerated volume in its most mature markets while expanding margin, and it has fallen 12.3% for reasons that have nothing to do with any of that. The decline is a macroeconomic repricing of a long-duration consumer asset, delivered by a central bank that raised rates for the first time in three years and signalled more. No company-specific fact deteriorated in the interval, the sell side upgraded into the fall, the consensus target now sits 10% above the price, and the insiders who were selling roughly \$200 million of stock at \$190 have essentially stopped at \$166.

What holds the rating where it is comes down to one number and one absence. The number is 2.2, the ratio of Airbnb's forward multiple to Booking Holdings', which is the same ratio the August report declined to pay and is fractionally worse rather than better, because the peer fell harder. The absence is any figure attached to the growth legs that are supposed to justify it. Hotels compound at roughly three times the rate of homes but the company still will not say what share of nights they represent. AI search remains in live test with no disclosed conversion uplift. The AI host-pricing tool that management calls its single biggest growth lever is unpriced because it is unquantified. The September conference was the venue at which those numbers might have appeared and they did not; what appeared instead was an expansive account of how much is now possible.

The single biggest concern is no longer the multiple, which has compressed by five turns, but the macroeconomic path the multiple now has to survive. A committee tightening into a consumer whose real spending has stopped growing, whose fuel costs are 27% higher than a year ago and whose forward expectations sit in territory the Conference Board associates with recession, is a committee raising the probability of the one risk that has always been at the top of this company's list. Discretionary travel is among the first things a household defers. Airbnb will report into that on November 5 against comparisons it has already called tougher, with margin guided down year over year and only a partial quarter of the completed fee migration to show for it.

The right action is a smaller version of what it was in August. The level that converts this rating is still the one that was published, and the shares have reached its upper edge rather than passed through it, arriving at fair value rather than at a discount because fair value came down to meet them. A move into the lower half of that band, a Booking premium that narrows on its own, or a single quantified disclosure about hotels, AI search or the take rate would each be sufficient. Any one of those in the next two months is entirely plausible, which is why this remains a Watchlist rather than a Hold, and why the next scheduled review matters more than the last one did.

Sources. Airbnb Q2 2026 Shareholder Letter and Form 10-Q (SEC EDGAR, August 6 2026); Alpha Vantage GLOBAL_QUOTE for the September 18 2026 price of record; Twelve Data daily OHLCV, 300 sessions through September 18 2026; StockAnalysis.com for consensus targets, rating mix, share count, balance-sheet and peer figures, September 18–19 2026; moomoo news, notice and research aggregation for analyst actions and Form 4 and Rule 144 filings, September 8–18 2026; Federal Open Market Committee statement and Summary of Economic Projections,

September 16 2026; Bureau of Labor Statistics August CPI and employment situation; Bureau of Economic Analysis July personal income and outlays; Census Bureau August advance retail sales; Conference Board consumer confidence; US Treasury daily par yield curve; HousingWire and the Wall Street Journal on the \$250 million housing commitment, September 14 2026; Airbnb Resource Center guidance on simplified service fees; Goldman Sachs Communacopia + Technology Conference 2026 commentary as reported. No earnings call has taken place since the last review and none was outstanding for it; Airbnb next reports on November 5 2026.

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